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THE PERSPECTIVAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
Blake McAllister

Whether evil provides evidence against the existence of God, and to what
degree, depends on how things seem to the subject—i.e., on one’s perspective.
I explain three ways in which adopting an atheistic perspective can increase
support for atheism via considerations of evil. The first is by intensifying the
common sense problem of evil by making evil seem gratuitous or intrinsically
wrong to allow. The second is by diminishing the apparent fit between theism
and our observations of evil. The third is by lowering the initial plausibility of
theism. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil” and argue that skeptical
theism does not fully address it.

Eleonore Stump offers us the following premise:
Imagine an intelligent being Max from a far-distant world in which all sentient beings live only in one very large edifice, outside of which there is
nothing at all. None of these beings is ever seriously sick, and none of them
ever dies. And now suppose that Max, who has seen nothing else of earth
life, is somehow enabled to see a video of events inside a large city hospital
on earth, where the Chief of Staff is a surgeon.1

Stump goes on to describe how differently Max will judge the Chief of Staff
than those of us who know and understand sickness, death, medicine, and
their places in the larger world. What Max believes to be sadistic torture,
we desire for the sake of healing. While Max scoffs at the idea of life outside of the hospital, we orient our entire stay around it. Suffering that Max
believes to be gratuitous we consent to in faith and hope. The story illustrates how one’s beliefs about God and evil depends to a great extent on
which belief-system, or worldview, is operating in the background.
I want to draw attention to the role that experience, broadly construed,
plays in the interpretive process. Max not only believes the suffering of the
patients to be incompatible with a loving Chief of Staff, he perceives the situation that way. Procedures which prod and poke seem cruel and heinous
to Max in a way that they do not to us. Life outside the hospital seems
Stump, “Reply to Draper,” 204. See also Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 17–18.
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almost comically implausible. The pain he witnesses appears pointless.
How things seem (his perspective) and what Max believes (his worldview) are interrelated, each influencing the other in turn. The implication
is that one’s conclusions about God and evil depend not only on one’s
worldview but on one’s perspective as well.
Part of what makes the problem of evil so intractable is that encountering evil, both suffering it and observing the suffering of others, has the
potential to enact precisely the sort of change in perspective that results
in an interpretive framework on which suffering constitutes serious evidence against the existence of a loving God—or at least in which the overall plausibility of God’s existence is otherwise significantly diminished.
This is a largely unacknowledged means by which experiences of evil can
generate rational support for atheism.2 Even if it is not evil per se that
engenders the atheistic perspective, the vital point is that the onset of such
a perspective leads to increased support for atheism via considerations of
evil. I call this “the perspectival problem of evil.”
I begin by charting out how encounters with evil can shift one’s perspective (Section I) and how this can result in increased support for atheism
(Section II). This mapping is not only worthwhile in itself, but also holds
crucial insights into how one must respond in order to defeat such support. In particular, I will be at pains to show that skeptical theism does not
completely cut off the support for atheism generated by the perspectival
problem of evil—for some, perhaps, but not for everyone. Thus, skeptical
theism may be part of the theist’s response, but it cannot be the whole of it.
To be clear, this is not an objection to skeptical theism so much as to the pretense that it provides a final and decisive blow to the problem of evil. I hint
(in Section III) at what a more complete theistic response needs to look like,
and conclude (in Section IV) with how the perspectival nature of rationality should affect our approach to the problem of evil more generally.
1. Perspective Shifts
In this section, I will introduce three important ways in which evil can
alter one’s perspective. Before doing so, however, I need to clarify the
notion of a perspective.
A perspective is a formative and lasting disposition for things to seem a
certain way. There is a specific kind of experience or mental state at issue here
called “seemings” or “appearances.” Seemings are r epresentational mental
states with propositional content. What sets them apart is their phenomenal character, which makes their content feel as though it is true or false.3
2
The recent exception is Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,”
which is discussed below. See also Gellman, “Religious Experience,” for an application of
this approach to religious experience.
3
Some argue that seemings are beliefs or inclinations to believe rather than experiences of
the sort I describe here. See McAllister, “Seemings and Sui Generis,” for an overview of the
debate and a defense of the experience view.
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Seemings come in many varieties: perceptual, memorial, introspective, intellectual (commonly called “intuitions”), and possibly more. For instance,
when one intuits that everything is identical to itself, the subject has an intellectual seeming with the propositional content 〈∀x (x = x)〉. Furthermore, it
presents that content to the subject in a way that makes it feel true or representative of the way things really are. Other kinds of seemings have the
same structure as intellectual seemings but are accompanied and occasioned
by other distinctive kinds of mental states. Perceptual seemings, for example, are prompted by sensations (broadly understood as the sort of mental
states involving sensory phenomenology such as sights, sounds, smells,
tastes, and tactile feels).4 Thus, the broader perceptual process has a kind
of two-step structure: first come perceptual sensations, which then give rise
to perceptual seemings.5 More often than not, these perceptual seemings
will be about the states of affairs that are (non-conceptually) represented in
one’s sensations.6 Thus, I might receive various perceptual sensations as of
a black dog running towards me, which then occasion in me the perceptual
seeming that my dog is running over to greet me. Importantly, a stranger
may have the same s ensations as I do and yet, given the differences in our
background information and cognitive habituation, experience a different
perceptual seeming. It may seem to him that a non-descript black dog is
running towards him, or (if he is skittish) that a vicious black dog is coming
to attack him. This last example illustrates just how differently the world
can seem to different people, even if they are both interacting with the same
concrete state of affairs.
One’s seemings can be systematically oriented in a certain way, disposing one to see the world in light of a particular interpretive framework.
Most relevant to us, individuals can come to possess theistic or atheistic
perspectives on the world. Generally speaking, things will seem to be as

4
Some, like Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, argue that perceptual seemings
should be identified with sensations (perhaps of a special sort). I side with Tucker, “Why
Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism,” in thinking that seemings should be
kept distinct from sensations, though they are closely related in that sensations give rise
to perceptual seemings and perceptual seemings may make reference to things presented
non-conceptually in sensations. The broader aims of this paper do not, however, depend on
the distinction between seemings and sensations.
5
The relationship between a perceptual seeming and a perceptual experience will be left
open. One could maintain that the perceptual seeming comes after the perceptual experience, or that it just is the perceptual experience, or that it is one component of the perceptual experience along with perceptual sensations. This last theory is called “dual-component
theory” in Smith, The Problem of Perception. It is most commonly associated with Thomas
Reid. See Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind. See Bengson, Grube, and Korman, “A New
Framework for Conceptualism,” for a contemporary version of dual-component theory that
I find more convincing than Reid’s.
6
Instead of characterizing those states with sensory phenomenology as non-conceptual
representations (e.g., Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness), one might think of them as relational
states in which objects are directly presented to one’s awareness (e.g., Campbell, Reference
and Consciousness).
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they would be were God (not) to exist.7 For instance, someone with an
atheistic perspective might be disposed to have a constellation of seemings and intuitions that align with naturalism: it seems to them that there
are no gods, that naturalism is a simpler hypothesis than bare theism, that
observed phenomena (even consciousness) can be adequately explained
without introducing anything immaterial, that the existence of anything at
all is just a brute fact, that there is no great purpose or meaning to reality,
that there are no objective moral values or duties, and, of special note, that
a loving God would be unlikely or unable to allow the kinds of evils we
observe. This describes an especially thorough-going atheistic perspective, but it is entirely possible and common for people to have an atheistic
perspective with respect to some areas but not others.
My contention is that encountering evil can shift one into an atheistic
perspective, pervasively or with respect to a particular area. I take this
to be a fairly uncontroversial empirical claim—one that most of us have
witnessed in ourselves or others and that is consonant with our general
understanding of how the human mind functions. That being said, we
would do well to see if psychology can offer us anything to confirm or
disconfirm our hypothesis.
To begin, many psychological studies have observed a correlation
between negative life events and the loss or lessening importance of religious belief.8 Add to this that suffering personal misfortune and hearing
about the suffering of others are two of the most common reasons put
forwards by apostates to explain their loss of belief.9 This is not to say
that most people change their religious beliefs in response to negative life
events (most don’t), or even that the dampening of religious beliefs is the
most common alteration undergone. Indeed, as many or more people see
an increase in religiosity as a result of negative life events—a phenomenon
Interestingly, De Cruz (“Cognitive Science of Religion and the Study of Theological
Concepts”) and De Cruz and De Smedt (“How Do Philosophers Evaluate Natural Theological
Arguments?”) find “a robust correlation between perceived strength of natural theological
arguments and religious belief” (De Cruz and De Smedt, “How Do Philosophers Evaluate
Natural Theological Arguments?”, 139). The proclivity to fall into theistic or atheistic perspectives on the world would aptly explain these findings.
8
E.g., Aten et al., “Predictors of God Concept and God Control After Hurricane Katrina”;
Ben-Ezra et al., “Losing my Religion”; Bierman, “The Effects of Childhood Maltreatment on
Adult Religiosity and Spirituality”; Falsetti, Resick, and Davis, “Changes in Religious Beliefs
Following Trauma”; Fontana and Rosenheck, “Trauma, Change in Strength of Religious
Faith, and Mental Health Service Use Among Veterans Treated for PTSD”; Gall et al., “A
Longitudinal Study on the Role of Spirituality in Response to the Diagnosis and Treatment of
Breast Cancer”; Krause and Hayward, “Humility, Lifetime Trauma, and Change in Religious
Doubt Among Older Adults”; Seirmarco et al., “Religiosity and Mental Health”; Walker
et al., “Changes in Personal Religion/Spirituality During and After Childhood Abuse.”
9
Zuckerman, Galen, and Pasquale, The Nonreligious. This is not to say that such reasons
are predominant. The most common factor cited in this study was a kind of “acquired incredulity” (ibid, 96) in which their religious belief simply stopped seeming true. (Although it
would not surprise me if the onset of this acquired incredulity sometimes had to do with
seeing or suffering evil).
7
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illuminated by the work of Kenneth Pargament and others on how religious beliefs are used to cope with or make sense of suffering.10 This is not
inconsistent, of course, with my initial observation that negative events
also have a significant potential to result in the loss of religious belief. The
fact is that negative events are polarizing—they have a much greater tendency than most other kinds of events to send people in one direction or
the other, to bolster religious beliefs or dismantle them.
Psychologists are still developing an understanding of precisely how
suffering leads to the loss of religious belief. Unsurprisingly, the causes are
manifold and complex. For instance, while intellectual theorizing surely
plays some role,11 there is also evidence that negative emotions, such as
being angry with God or perceiving him as cruel or distant, can be an
important factor in this process. Studies show that undergoing suffering
can lead to negative feelings towards God12 and that such feelings are
often a significant factor in non-belief.13 My only sticking point here is a
moderate one: that the story of how suffering leads to non-belief is generally more complex than people observing suffering, reasoning through
the philosophical problem of evil, and changing their beliefs accordingly.
What role do appearances play in this more complex story? A recent
study sought to isolate this very thing.14 The study tracked the God images
(how one experiences God) and God concepts (what one believes about God)
of undergraduate students at six months and twelve months after undergoing religious or spiritual struggles (RS struggles) such as those caused
by suffering. Researchers found that by six months students perceived God
more negatively, but held largely the same religious beliefs. By twelve
months, however, those who perceived God negatively also believed more
negatively. Thus, RS struggles “predict less benevolent experiences with
God six months later, which, in turn, predict less benevolent theological
doctrine of God six months after that.”15 Interestingly, researchers found
that RS struggles were “not directly associated with people’s theological/doctrinal understanding of God across the time points,” but were
indirectly associated with less benevolent God concepts via less benevolent God images.16 This indicates is that, “the changes to one’s theology

Pargament, The Psychology of Religion and Coping.
Apostates generally identify intellectual reasons as the most important (though not the
exclusive) factor in their loss of belief (e.g., Bradley et al., “The Reasons of Atheists and
Agnostics for Nonbelief in God’s Existence Scale”).
12
E.g., Exline et al., “Anger Toward God.”
13
E.g., Bradley, Exline, Uzdavines, “Relational Reasons for Nonbelief in the Existence of
Gods.” Interestingly, Bradley et al., “The Reasons of Atheists and Agnostics for Nonbelief in
God’s Existence Scale,” found that negative relational reasons for non-belief (such as being
angry at God) correlated more highly with citing the problem of evil as a cause of non-belief
than did intellectual reasons.
14
Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations.”
15
Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 230.
16
Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 228.
10
11
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happen over time and are a result of how one experiences God differently
as a result of RS struggles.”17
While the psychological literature in this area is nascent,18 it should
come as no surprise to anyone human or familiar with humans that suffering can alter how things seem to the person. Forgive me, then, for going
beyond the literature and identifying three specific ways in which suffering can alter one’s perspective. Obviously, these claims are open to (dis)
confirmation as further data rolls in.
The first tendency of note is evil’s ability to change the way one feels
about evil itself. In particular, witnessing some evil can incite the kinds of
experiences emphasized by Trent Dougherty and Jerome Gellman in which
it seems to the subject that an instance, kind, or pattern of evil is morally
impermissible for God to allow.19 There are two kinds of “impermissibility appearances” corresponding to the two ways in which an allowance
might be impermissible. First, it can seem that evil is gratuitous.20 Such
an intuition tacitly concedes that allowing such evil might be permissible
if there was some greater good or worse evil suitably connected to it, but
insists that such things are absent.21 These “gratuitous evil appearances,”
as we might call them, have received increasing attention in the literature.
Van Tongeren et al., “Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God Representations,” 231.
Van Tongeren et al., write, “This study is the first, to our knowledge, to contribute to
our understanding of how these RS struggles predict the way people experientially relate
to and doctrinally view God over time” (“Religious and Spiritual Struggles Alter God
Representations,” 231).
19
See Dougherty, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,” and
“The Common Sense Problem of Evil,” and Gellman, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil,”
and “A Surviving Version of the Common Sense Problem of Evil.” In the lattermost, Gellman
seems to misinterpret Dougherty on how evil is experienced. Gellman interprets Dougherty
as saying that the subject experiences a poignant evil and then quickly infers that this evil is
gratuitous. As an alternative, Gellman suggests that subjects (at least sometimes) experience
evil as gratuitous. The gratuitousness of the evil is embedded in the content of the experience
itself rather than coming downstream from the experience via inference. Dougherty’s claim,
however, has always been the same as Gellman’s. On Dougherty’s account, the subject has a
seeming with the propositional content 〈this evil is gratuitous〉. Thus, the gratuitousness of
the evil is a part of the representational content of the experiential state.
20
Note that the truth conditions of “it appears to S that p” is just S’s possession of a seeming with the propositional content p. This is different from how Wykstra uses that phrase in
his CORNEA principle: “On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim
‘It appears that p’ only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties
and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is
in some way discernible by her” (Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments
from Suffering,” 85). It should be of little controversy that evil can seem gratuitous in the
former sense (and that one is entitled to claim this), even if there is a second sense of that
phrase for which Wykstra’s principle holds true.
21
Some people question whether it can appear to you that something is absent (e.g.,
whether it can appear to you that there is no elephant in the room). Maybe it can only appear
to you that something is present, from which you must infer an absence (e.g., it appears to
you that there is a room with tables and chairs in it, but it does not appear to do you that
there is elephant, thus you infer that there is no elephant in the room). On the account of
seemings given above, this worry is clearly misguided. There is no reason why a seeming
17
18
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Tragically less attention has been given to the appearance that some evil
is intrinsically wrong for God to allow. For instance, upon encountering
someone who has been allowed to suffer “consciousness-shattering horror without a clue as to why,” it may seem that this is something that
is never moral to permit.22 Just as killing an innocent human may seem
wrong, damn the consequences, so allowing certain kinds of suffering
may seem inherently wrong no matter what greater good may come of it.
Suffering oneself, or observing it in others, can increase the intensity or
frequency of these impermissibility appearances.
Encountering evil can also affect how well theism seems to fit with the
patterns of evil and suffering that we observe. For example, take Richard
Swinburne’s claim that God’s preventing cancer would have deprived
us of the opportunity to freely perform the great good actions needed to
strive against it and perhaps one day eliminate cancer.23 This may seem
to someone to be a great good indeed, one worth allowing diseases like
cancer to secure . . . until that person’s loved one is diagnosed. What once
seemed “worth it” now seems far too high a cost.
The reach of evil extends even farther than this, however. Encountering
evil can bring about the kind of pervasive atheistic perspective described
above, and the onset of this perspective will often result in the adoption of
a matching system of beliefs—a phenomenon Gellman calls “noetic reconstruction,” i.e., “a new, extensive, systematic, modification of a person’s
noetic content.”24 Regarding the power of evil to trigger noetic reconstruction, Gellman writes,
[Noetic reconstruction] can be from a sudden switch, to “seeing” things in
a radical new way, or result from the appearance of deep noetic discontent
. . . . An atheistic conversion experience can be the cause of noetic reconstruction by giving rise all at once to a radical ingression into one’s noetic
framework so that one sees life and reality in a wholly new way. Alternately,
it can cause radical disruption of one’s noetic framework, issuing into noetic
discontent that then issues in noetic repair along atheistic lines.25

The crucial point for us is that experiencing evil can incite a radical new
way of seeing things, an atheistic perspective, that results in the adoption
of an atheistic worldview.26
might not have the propositional content 〈x is absent〉 or 〈there is no x here〉 or anything at
all, for that matter. Even with respect to perceptual seemings, there is no reason why perceptual sensations might not trigger a perceptual seeming with the proposition content 〈there
is no elephant in this room〉. The debate about whether there can be appearances of absence
are, in my estimation, only of concern for those who identify seemings and sensations. For
it is a controversial question whether absences can be represented in perceptual sensations.
22
Dougherty, “The Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
23
Swinburne, Is There a God?, Ch. 6.
24
Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107.
25
Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107.
26
Gellman outlines several causal pathways that evil might take in revising one’s worldview (“The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 107–108), but that level of detail is
unnecessary for our current purposes.
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Finally, note that this general sort of perspective shift can be brought on
by other kinds of experience besides that of evil. For instance, becoming
the mentee of a brilliant and charismatic naturalist (if only through books)
might, through one’s interactions, result in the shift towards an atheistic perspective. Thus, the conclusions I draw about the epistemological
effects of such shifts, will apply equally well to situations in which something other than evil serves as the trigger.
2. The Perspectival Problem of Evil
Return now to the problem of evil. There are of course many formulations
of the problem,27 each of which calls for a different sort of treatment. Our
reasoning must nonetheless proceed through certain recognizable stages.
We begin with the evidence that purportedly poses a problem for theism.
Let us call it “the evidence of evil.” We then make an assessment of how
well the evidence of evil fits with theism.28 We then take into account all
of our other evidence, including the intrinsic plausibility of theism, before
reaching our final position. In this section, I will show how encountering
evil can affect each of these stages in ways that pose a threat to theism. It is
this tendency for evil (and other life experiences) to produce a perspective
on which observed evils constitute serious evidence against God’s existence that gives rise to the perspectival problem of evil.
The discussion will proceed from an internalist point of view: roughly,
the factors considered relevant for justification or rationality will be limited
to those the subject is aware of within his or her first-person point of view.
Ideally, we could discuss both internalist and externalist approaches to these
issues, but doing so simply isn’t feasible given the space available. By way of
terminology, I will often talk about the rational support that evil provides for
atheism. As I use the term here, S has justification for believing p if and only
if S has sufficient rational support for p. Gaining rational support for p does
not guarantee justification, but it does tend towards it: if the total balance of
rational support tips enough in favor of p, then believing p is justified.
2.1. Impermissibility Appearances
The evidence of evil will be different for each person if only for the mundane reason that no two people know about exactly the same evils. But
27
E.g., Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence”; Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties
of Atheism”; Draper, “Pain and Pleasure.”
28
In Mackie’s logical problem of evil, the evidence of evil consists in the existence of any
evil whatsoever, and we must assess whether that evidence is logically compatible with theism. (Mackie says they’re not). In Rowe’s evidential problem of evil, the evidence of evil
consists in our observations of evil, and we must assess whether these observations are likely
to be compatible with theism (Rowe says observed evils are probably gratuitous and, accordingly, probably incompatible with theism). In Draper’s probabilistic problem of evil, the evidence of evil consists in observed patterns of pleasure and pain, and we must assess whether
these patterns are more likely given theism or the hypothesis of indifference (Draper says
they are more likely given the latter).
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even if we had observed all and only the same evils, our evidence would
still not be the same. This is because different people can construe the same
state of affairs in different ways. What seems this way to one will seem
that way to another. Thus, when it comes to the problem of evil, not only
do people assess the evidence differently, they are assessing different evidence! The onset of an atheistic perspective can affect how one experiences
evil, thereby altering the evidence of evil that one sets out to evaluate.
An important instance of this general effect is that the shift towards an
atheistic perspective can intensify impermissibility appearances.29 Some
think these appearances provide immediate rational support for believing
that the observed evils are impermissible.30 Obviously, if the existence of
morally unallowable evils is admitted into the evidence of evil, then this
would provide rational support for atheism.
The controversial point here is whether impermissibility appearances
really do provide one with rational support for their content. Dougherty
points out that, given a principle like phenomenal conservatism (often
called a “common sense epistemic principle” in light of its association
with the common sense epistemological tradition of Chisholm, Moore,
and Reid), such appearances provide prima facie justification for believing
that the observed evils are impermissible.31
Phenomenal conservatism (PC) If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of
defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing
that p.32

Gellman argues that the same is true given Swinburne’s principle of credulity (a principle closely related to PC and the common sense epistemological tradition).33 Dougherty calls the power of impermissibility

29
This is not the only way in which one’s perspective can significantly affect the evidence
of evil. For instance, the same evil may appear more heinous or cruel or random from one
perspective than from another, adding content to the evidence of evil that is harder to square
with the existence of a loving God.
30
If the relevant seeming is a gratuitous evil appearance, then things may be slightly
trickier. This is because, granting van Inwagen’s point in The Problem of Evil that some gratuitous evils are unavoidable, the gratuitousness of an evil does not entail its impermissibility. Nevertheless, the gratuitousness of an evil will still greatly lower the probability of its
permissibility. Furthermore, the existence of certain kinds or magnitudes or frequencies of
gratuitous evil will still be morally non-allowable, even granting van Inwagen’s point, and
gratuitous evil appearances can provide rational support for believing that those specific
conditions obtain.
31
Dougherty, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism.”
32
Huemer, “Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism,” 30. A more moderate version of
phenomenal conservatism that only guarantees some level of rational support for the content of seemings (but perhaps not a level of rational support sufficient for justification) would
still pose a problem for the theist.
33
See Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 100–102. Swinburne,
The Existence of God, contains his principle of credulity. Swinburne addresses phenomenal conservatism and religious experience in “Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious
Experience.”
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appearances to provide immediate and non-inferential rational support
for the existence of evils incompatible with God “the common sense problem of evil.” Thus, a key element of the perspectival problem of evil is an
intensification of the common sense problem of evil, as the shift towards
an atheistic perspective can make impermissibility appearances stronger,
more frequent, and more resilient.
Earlier I identified two kinds of impermissibility appearances: appearances of gratuitousness and appearances of intrinsic wrongness. Their differences are relevant for the following discussion, and so I will treat them
in sequence, beginning with the former.
Given PC, gratuitous evil appearances are clearly a potential source of
support for atheism. There have been two main responses to this, both
from skeptical theists. Skeptical theists are theists who endorse something
like the following principle and take that endorsement to undermine the
rationality of believing in the existence of gratuitous evils (particularly via
a noseeum inference):
ST – Humans are in no position to judge directly that an omnipotent and
omniscient being would be unlikely to have a morally sufficient reason to
permit the evils we find in the world.34

Skeptical theists support ST in many ways, including by appeal to the
following sorts of skeptical theses:
ST1 – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods we know
of are representative of the possible goods there are.
ST2 – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils we know
of are representative of the possible evils there are.
ST3 – We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations we
know of between possible goods and the permission of possible evils are
representative of the entailment relations there are between possible goods
and the permission of possible evils.35

Reflection, the skeptical theist maintains, shows such theses to be exceedingly plausible. These, in turn, support ST.
The first skeptical theist response is to concede that gratuitous evil
appearances initially provide rational support for the existence of pointless evils, but argue that learning ST defeats this initial support.36 The second is to deny PC, arguing that, in light of ST, gratuitous evil appearances
do not provide even initial rational support for believing their content.37
I will have something to say about both of these responses, starting with
the former.
Draper, “The Skeptical Theist,” 176.
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 11–12.
36
Matheson, “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism”; Rutledge,
“Perspectival Skeptical Theism.”
37
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism”; Senor, “Skeptical Theism, CORNEA, and
Common Sense Epistemology”; Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
34
35
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Matheson argues that if one comes to believe in ST, even with modest confidence, then one will have an undercutting defeater sufficient to
remove all of the rational support provided by gratuitous evil appearances. To see why, note that having a gratuitous evil appearance is akin to
“a person, upon seeing Mount Everest, claiming that it seems that Mount
Everest is the tallest mountain in the universe.”38 A moments reflection
should convince the subject that this appearance ought not be trusted—
one isn’t in a position to compare the height of Mount Everest, towering
though it may be, to all of the other mountains in the universe. ST gives us
similar reasons for doubting the appearance that nothing could justify an
observed evil.39 Thus, Matheson is correct that learning ST will diminish
the support provided by gratuitous evil appearances; however, it may not
always eliminate it entirely.40 In essence, even if we think ST x likely, that
still leaves 1-x chance that we are in a position to judge such matters and,
thus, that our appearances can be trusted. The lower x is, the greater the
potential that one still possesses some degree of increased rational support for believing the content of his or her gratuitous evil appearances.
To illustrate the point, consider a situation in which you are asked to
search the room for a certain kind of bug called “maybe-see-ums.” You
search the room thoroughly, and it seems to you that there are no maybesee-ums. You thereby gain some rational support for believing that there
aren’t any maybe-see-ums in the room. You then find an info sheet listing
facts about maybe-see-ums, including that they cannot be seen with the
naked eye. Does this counter the rational support provided by your seeming? It depends on how much you trust the info sheet. If you see that it’s
published by an expert entomologist, then all (or almost all) of the rational
support provided by that seeming will be effectively countered. If you see
that it’s an elementary school project written in crayon perhaps it only
partially counters the rational support provided by your seeming—after
all, maybe the report is wrong and you would be able to see the maybesee-ums if they were there. The point is that the defeat of one’s rational
support is not an all or nothing matter. The same is true with respect to
gratuitous evil appearances and skeptical theism. If we are only somewhat skeptical of our abilities to judge whether God has reasons for allowing evil (the lower the probability of ST), then some of the initial rational
support provided by our gratuitous evil appearances can still get through.
Regarding the probability of ST, one possibility worth considering is
whether gratuitous evil appearances in and of themselves can give one
reason to doubt ST. Consider a potential Moorean response to external
world skepticism. It seems to the subject that there is an external world.
The external world skeptic seeks to undermine any justification this
Hendricks, “How to Be a Skeptical Theist and a Commonsense Epistemologist,” 350.
See the scathing and powerful critique of gratuitous evil appearances (and those who
champion them) in Hudson, A Grotesque in the Garden, 122–124.
40
Dougherty, “Further Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism,”
336–339.
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external world seeming might provide by putting forward something
analogous to ST:
Ex-ST – Humans are in no position to judge directly that an evil deceiver is
unlikely to be manipulating them into falsely believing in an external world.

The Moorean responds, “Well, I obviously know that there’s an external
world, so I know I am not being deceived. Hence, I must be in a position to
judge that an evil deceiver is unlikely to be manipulating me. Thus, Ex-ST is
false.” Bergmann makes this sort of move with respect to God’s reasons in
response to Wilks.41 Bergmann claims we can know immediately, as a matter of common sense, that we have hands, and from that we can infer that
God does not have a sufficient all–things–considered reason for deceiving us
about this. It follows that we must be in a position to directly judge God’s
reasons in this instance at least. If this Moorean response is effective, then it’s
not immediately apparent why someone couldn’t do the same with a strong
enough appearance of gratuitous evil, saying to oneself, “I obviously know
that this evil is gratuitous, so I know that there is no morally justifying reason to allow it. Hence, I must be in a position to judge that God is unlikely
to have a morally sufficient reason for permitting this evil. Thus, ST is false.”
From the inside, this reasoning mirrors Bergmann’s reasoning exactly. Such
a Moorean strategy may be flawed, but at the very least it puts pressure on
those skeptical theists who favor a Moorean response to skepticism.
If one does not favor the Moorean response, then how is one to defend
against external world skepticism and Ex-ST? A predominant response
is that, in building a case for Ex-ST, the skeptic manages to establish only
the possibility that we are being deceived—that we cannot absolutely rule
out the possibility of deception. The skeptic does not show that there is
any plausibility that we are wrong. And the mere possibility of error is
insufficient to establish that we are in no position to judge the matter at
hand. There is a principle here—that the plausibility of error is required
to undermine our confidence in our ability to discern something—which
we can call “the plausibility requirement.” One might object to skeptical
theism along the same lines. One could concede that the skeptical theists’ arguments for ST show that possibly there are reasons beyond our
ken which could morally justify God’s allowing observed evils. But it is
much less clear that these arguments establish that plausibly there are reasons which could morally justify God’s allowing observed evils. In other
words, it is not evident that the plausibility requirement has been met.
This is especially true of those who accept the condition, endorsed by
Stump and many others, that morally justifying goods must accrue primarily to the sufferer.42 For then, whatever other cosmic goods beyond our ken
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 27 and Wilks, “Skeptical Theism and
Empirical Unfalsifiability.”
42
Stump, Wandering in Darkness. See also the position of Adams, Horrendous Evils and the
Goodness of God, that for God to count as loving towards someone, it must be the case that he
defeats their suffering, where defeat requires at minimum ensuring that one’s life is on the
whole worth living.
41
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may be made available by human suffering, God must also use that suffering to bring about goods for the human victims—a domain with which we
are much more familiar. To see why this is important, notice that one can
endorse ST1-ST3 above without being committed ST1*-ST3*:
ST1* – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible goods for
humans we know of are representative of the possible goods for humans
there are.
ST2* – We have no good reason for thinking that the possible evils for humans
we know of are representative of the possible evils for humans there are.
ST3* – We have no good reason for thinking that the entailment relations
we know of between possible goods for humans and the permission of possible evils for humans are representative of the entailment relations there are
between possible goods for humans and the permission of possible evils for
humans.

Limiting our focus to human goods can give one increased confidence in
his or her grasp of the relevant domain and, in turn, increased assurance
in his or her ability to make judgments concerning the gratuitousness of
suffering, thus lowering confidence in ST.43
To sum up, in order to justify ST, the skeptical theist needs to establish
the plausibility of error in assessing the gratuitousness of evil, not just its
possibility. But there is reasonable disagreement about whether the skeptical theist has met this burden. There are many more arguments for and
against ST that would need to be considered in assessing its overall likelihood, and this is not the forum to survey those arguments. Suffice it to say
that ST is not rationally uncontestable, and there may even be those for
whom the probability of ST is not particularly high. This leaves the door
open for gratuitous evil appearances to continue to provide some level of
rational support for the existence of gratuitous evils.
The second way of responding to gratuitous evil appearances promises
to prevent gratuitous evil appearances from providing any rational support at all. This strategy maintains that gratuitous evil appearances do not
provide even initial rational support for believing in the existence of gratuitous evils. This requires one to deny PC, at least with respect to gratuitous evil appearances. Denying PC is a cost as there are, in my judgment,
good reasons for endorsing PC.44 Nevertheless, even if we drop PC, it does

Bergmann, in “Skeptical Theism and Rowe’s New Evidential Argument from Evil,” in
a response to similar observations made in Rowe’s “The Empirical Argument from Evil,”
claims he finds ST1* (and, we can extrapolate, ST2* and ST3*) plausible for the same kinds
of reasons he endorses ST1-3. Of course, it’s not clear that all rational people must agree
with Bergmann here. At the very least, one might reasonably find ST1*–3* significantly less
plausible than one finds ST1–3, thereby creating greater opportunity for partially undefeated
gratuitous evil appearances.
44
See, e.g., Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and “Phenomenal Conservatism
and the Internalist Intuition”; Tucker, “Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse
Dogmatism”; and McAllister, “Restoring Common Sense.”
43
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not immediately follow that gratuitous evil appearances fail to provide
rational support for believing in the existence of gratuitous evils. Indeed,
it is relatively uncontroversial among non-skeptical folk that, in general,
learning that something seems to be the case will give one some rational
support for believing that it is the case.45 (This better be true! Try doing
philosophy, or engaging in any rational discipline for that matter, without
relying on the way things appear). So, we need some reason to think that
appearances of gratuitous evil are an exception to the general rule.
Michael Bergmann provides one possible reason. Bergmann insists that
we cannot “just see directly,” as a matter of common sense, that some evil
is gratuitous (or even probably so).46 Now, it is perfectly clear that one can
“see directly” that some evil is gratuitous in the sense that one can have
a seeming with this content—a fact Bergmann surely would not deny.
What Bergmann does deny is that these seemings provide rational support for their content such that one can justifiably base a basic belief on
them. But why? Bergmann is happy to concede that other seemings, such
as the appearance that I have hands, can rationally support basic beliefs
in their content. Given Bergmann’s proper functionalism and Reidian
commonsensism,47 the answer is likely that the only seemings which can
rationally support basic beliefs are ones produced by the proper functioning of our reliably truth-aimed faculties operating in an appropriate
environment,48 and gratuitous evil appearances don’t meet those criteria.
This proposal is not acceptable to the internalist, since it appeals to factors of which the subject might not be aware—namely, the casual origins
of the seeming. Of course, if the subject learns that his or her gratuitous
evil appearances are not produced by properly functioning faculties, then
this would provide an undermining defeater for the rational support provided by that appearance. But the causal origins of the seeming cannot
be used to block initial rational support from occurring in the first place.
If one does opt for the defeater route, we must circle back around to the
conclusions of our previous discussion: namely, that the defeat of this
initial support may only be partial depending on how probable ST is on
the subject’s evidence.
Chris Tweedt offers a more internalist-friendly reason to think that gratuitous evil appearances do not provide any rational support for believing

45
Explanationists, for instance, can maintain that, in ordinary evidential situations, the
best explanation of the fact that it seems to you that p includes the truth of p. (There is,
however, an important difference between how seemings provide evidence on PC and how
they do so on explanationism. For PC, seemings themselves immediately move one into a
position in which it is rational to believe their content, absent defeaters. On explanationism,
updating on the proposition 〈it seems that p〉 provides inferential support for p). For an
externalist approach to seemings, see Bergmann, “Externalist Justification and the Role of
Seemings.”
46
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 19.
47
See Bergmann, Justification Without Awareness and “Reidian Externalism,” respectively.
48
See Bergmann, “Externalist Justification and the Role of Seemings,” section 2.2.
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their content. Tweedt proposes a modified version of Stephen Wykstra’s
CORNEA principle:
Reformulated CORNEA – Evidence E that is new to S (incrementally) supports hypothesis H only if it is the case that if H were false, E would more
likely be different.49

The necessary condition on confirmation should be understood in terms
of conditional epistemic probabilities rather than counterfactuals.50 Thus,
we can reformulate Tweedt’s Reformulated CORNEA as follows (where
“P(E|H & B)” means the epistemic probability of evidence E given
hypothesis H and background evidence B):
Re-reformulated CORNEA – E (incrementally) supports H only if P(E|H & B) >
P(E|~H & B)

Applied to appearances of gratuitous evil, the basic idea is that the proposition 〈it seems that there are gratuitous evils〉 will confirm that there are
gratuitous evils only if the existence of these appearances is more likely
given the existence of gratuitous evils than their non-existence. Even more
simply, say there weren’t gratuitous evils. Would you still be just as likely
to have appearances of gratuitous evil? If so, then those appearances don’t
rationally support the existence of gratuitous evil.
Let us assume that Reformulated CORNEA is true. Even granting this
principle, it is not at all obvious that gratuitous evil appearances don’t
support the existence of gratuitous evils. The key is whether P(E|H &
B) > P(E|~H & B), where E = 〈it seems that there are gratuitous evils〉
and H = 〈there are gratuitous evils〉. The skeptical theist will try to argue
that, “We’re so severely cognitively limited and in the dark about God’s
reasons for allowing evil, the relations between various goods and evils,
and so on that even if there weren’t any gratuitous evil, we would be
just as likely to have the same experiences of poignant evil.”51 But this
line of thought is highly contestable. Given ordinary human background
evidence, wouldn’t it be more likely to appear that there are gratuitous
evils if those kinds of evils really existed? After all, if gratuitous evils are
out there, then it’s not unlikely that one runs into them and recognizes
them as such, especially if they are ubiquitous as they are likely to be
on naturalism. So, appearances of gratuitous evil should be expected to
happen with some regularity. But if there aren’t any gratuitous evils, one
wouldn’t necessarily expect to have regular appearances of gratuitous
evil. At least, one might reasonably expect such appearances to be less
frequent than in a world with actual gratuitous evil. To bolster the point,
consider: if every single evil had a greater purpose to it, then shouldn’t
we expect to discover justifying reasons more often than in a world full of

Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401.
Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 401–402.
51
Tweedt, “Defusing the Common Sense Problem of Evil,” 403.
49
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gratuitous evils?52 In which case we should expect gratuitous evil appearances to be less common were there no gratuitous evils. Skeptical theists
might manufacture counters to this line of reasoning; nevertheless, this
seems a plausible representation of the conditional probabilities given
a fairly common set of background evidence.53 If so, then P(E|H & B) >
P(E|~H & B) for those with that sort of background evidence. These
people will continue to receive rational support from gratuitous evil
appearances.
Let us now turn to appearances of intrinsic wrongness—when it seems
to the subject that it is intrinsically wrong for God to allow some instance,
kind, or pattern of evil to occur. In accordance with PC, such appearances provide rational support for the existence of impermissible evils.
Even apart from PC, the general rule is that its appearing that p provides
some reason to believe that p. Part of what makes appearances of intrinsic
wrongness different, and more formidable, than gratuitous evil appearances is that there is no surveying of greater goods or worse evils for
skeptical theists to challenge. Instead, the inherent impermissibility of an
action (or inaction, rather) is intuited, presumably by whatever faculties
standardly produce moral intuitions, and our general ability to intuit such
moral principles should not be denied. In fact, skeptical theists have special reason to affirm this ability as it is helpful in warding off moral skepticism. For instance, part of Bergmann’s response to charges that skeptical
theism leads to moral skepticism is to argue:
Some actions are intrinsically morally wrong, regardless of their consequences. If some action appears to be intrinsically morally wrong, regardless
of its consequences, there’s no reason to think that a skeptical theist can’t, on
that basis, reasonably believe that it is morally wrong.54

In the same way, then, appearances of intrinsic wrongness may lead one
to reasonably believe that certain evils are intrinsically wrong for God
to allow.
How might the skeptical theist respond? Bergmann’s response is to
argue, for any of the evils we have observed, that appearances of intrinsic
wrongness do not rationally support their content. He does not wish to
undermine our moral intuitions generally, but only to challenge whether

52
Evils can appear to have a point when they actually do not (see, e.g., Nietzsche’s Human,
All Too Human, §108). My point is just that, plausibly, it is overall more likely to appear as
though there is a purpose to evil if there really is one.
53
We must keep in mind that we are looking at what one should reasonably expect given
the evidence available to him or her. Thus, the mere fact that it is possible for evils to seem gratuitous when they are not on a large scale does not counter the claim that one should expect
gratuitous evil appearances to be less frequent when there aren’t any genuinely gratuitous
evils. Even if that possibility were, in fact, one’s actual situation, it wouldn’t change what is
reasonable for one to expect unless one gains evidence to that effect.
54
Bergmann, “Commonsense Skeptical Theism,” 26.
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in this case we are really in a position to see that allowing such evils is
intrinsically wrong. He begins by proposing the following:
P1 – For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred,
there are possible states of affairs that are significantly worse than it or possible states of affairs that are outweighing greater goods.

If we grant P1, then we should also be able to imagine a scenario in which
the suffering we know of is necessary to prevent some significantly worse
state of affairs or to attain some outweighing greater good—a scenario
that, given ST3, for all we know is true. Thus, P1 naturally leads to P2:
P2 – For every instance of horrific suffering that we know to have occurred,
although it is an intrinsically bad state of affairs, it is not intrinsically wrong
to permit it, regardless of the consequences.

Such considerations, if correct, would show that appearances of intrinsic
wrongness are in this context misguided.55 If it is wrong for God to permit
an evil, it is because there is no morally justifying reason, and the skeptical
theist’s skepticism about our grasp of potential morally justifying reasons
comes back into play.
Bergmann’s reasoning is plausible, but not incontestable. Let us first
draw a distinction between scenarios in which suffering is permitted to
prevent a worse state of affairs and those in which suffering is permitted
to attain some greater good. We can go ahead and grant that if God was
faced with the decision between allowing something bad and allowing
something far worse, then it would not be intrinsically wrong for him to
allow the lesser evil; however, the application of this principle to God’s
allowance of suffering is suspect. For most in the Christian tradition, at
least, God needn’t have created anything at all. Thus, God is never in the
situation of choosing between allowing the Holocaust and allowing something even worse, for he always has the morally permissible option of
just not creating. So while it is possible to imagine states of affairs much
worse than any of the sufferings we have observed, it may still be the case
that the allowance of those sufferings is wrong in any possible circumstance (because allowing worse states of affairs is, for God, never absolutely necessary for eliminating suffering).56 If intrinsic wrongness is to
be ruled out, it must be on the basis of outweighing greater goods. The
55
Put aside whether such considerations are supposed to defeat the initial support provided by appearances of intrinsic wrongness or to prevent them from providing any rational
in the first place. The upshot is largely the same, the main difference being the same one
observed with gratuitous evil appearances: allowing for initial support leaves open the possibility of merely partial defeat.
56
Allowing suffering might still be necessary for eliminating some worse evil in a conditional sense. For instance, it might be the case that one cannot eliminate suffering X without
allowing some worse state of affairs Y and forsaking some greater good Z. That is, if we want Z,
then we cannot eliminate X without bringing about Y. But this just goes to my larger point
that we will eventually need to appeal to an outweighing good to justify the allowance of
suffering.
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problem is that one can maintain, with some plausibility, that some of the
horrors we have witnessed are so terrible that the idea of an outweighing
good simply doesn’t come into consideration at all—there are some transactions you never make no matter what the potential return. This is, as
Dougherty points out,57 one of the intuitions elicited so poignantly by Ivan
in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov:
Tell me straight out, I call on you—answer me: imagine that you yourself
are building the edifice of human destiny with the object of making people
happy in the finale, of giving them peace and rest at last, but for that you
must inevitably and unavoidably torture just one tiny creature, that same
child who was beating her chest with her little fist, and raise your edifice on
the foundation of her unrequited tears—would you agree to be the architect
on such conditions? Tell me the truth.58

The intuition is echoed in Ursula Le Guin’s “The Ones Who Walk Away
From Omelas” and seems to be shared by many. It insists that no matter
how great a good might result, it is intrinsically wrong to achieve that
result, to “raise your edifice,” on the tears of an innocent child. Thus, while
greater goods may result from suffering, they cannot be said to outweigh
that suffering as P1 asserts, and so the basis for P2 is removed.
To be clear, I am not endorsing this objection to Bergmann’s reasoning
(in fact, I reject it). My point is that there are sure to be individuals who can
reasonably reject P1 and P2 in the way I have outlined. And such people
will, I submit, receive rational support for the existence of impermissible
evils when it seems to them that allowing some instance or kind of suffering is intrinsically wrong. Skeptical theism alone cannot prevent it.
2.2. How Well Does God’s Existence Fit with Evil?
Let us put aside impermissibility appearances and focus on the evidence
of evil more broadly. Whether the evidence of evil provides rational support against theism depends on how well that evidence fits with theism
and how this compares to the fit between that evidence and atheism.59 The
fit between theism and the evidence of evil, however, can be influenced by
Dougherty, “The Common Sense Problem of Evil.”
Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 245. It is actually unclear whether Ivan himself
has the intuition that God’s allowance of suffering is intrinsically wrong. There is a case
to be made that it does not seem to him that the suffering of children is unjustified (he
apparently concedes that it is); nonetheless, he emotionally construes God’s allowance of
suffering to be heinous. It may be this emotional barrier that motivates his rebellion rather
than the belief that God’s allowance is intrinsically wrong. See Colgrove, “The Emotional
Impact of Evil.”
59
This notion of “fit” is intended to be neutral between theories of epistemic support. For
instance, if one is a Bayesian, then one is welcome to understand “theism’s fit with observed
evils” to be referring to the conditional probability of theism given our observations of evil.
Or if one is an explanationist, then one is welcome to understand “theism’s fit with observed
evils” to be referring to how good of an explanation theism provides for our observations
of evil.
57
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one’s perspective. Specifically, the shift towards an atheistic perspective
can diminish the fit between theism and the evidence of evil for a subject,
thereby increasing the rational support that that evidence provides for
atheism. Here the perspective does not change the evidence but rather the
significance of the evidence.
There are at least two ways in which this might occur. First, the fit
between theism and observed evils can differ from subject to subject
depending on their background evidence. As Paul Draper says, “the plausibility of an interpretation is relative to the beliefs of the interpreter.”60
Remember Stump’s story of Max and the hospital. The conclusions one
should draw about evil and suffering depend to a great extent on which
interpretive framework is operating in the background.
To give a more familiar example, whether the evidence of evil fits well
with the existence of a loving God depends dramatically on what love is.
If love pursues the wellbeing of the beloved, and one holds a desire-satisfaction theory of wellbeing, then a loving God would seek to maximize
the desire-fulfillment of his creatures as far as he could. Our desires are
better satisfied in a heavenly paradise, so there is little reason to create
even a temporary epoch of human suffering. On this sort of worldview,
the evidence of evil might constitute serious evidence against the existence of a loving God. On the other hand, if your background evidence
provides for a morally richer world—one in which human wellbeing is
objective, requiring one to freely forsake worldly desires, adorn oneself
with virtue, and be transformed into the likeness of a sacrificial God—
then a temporary epoch of human suffering in which we are given opportunities to prepare for eternity makes more sense. On this worldview, the
evidence of evil may be no evidence against God at all. The upshot is that
evil might provide rational support for atheism given one set of background evidence but not another. Thus, shifting the background evidence
via a broader change in perspective can move one into a position where
the evidence of evil supports atheism in a way it didn’t before.
Note that this kind of reinterpretation of the evidence is perfectly compatible with the position that epistemic support relations are objective
and necessary. It is likewise compatible with Feldman’s uniqueness thesis, which maintains that a body of evidence can rationally support “at
most one attitude towards any particular proposition.”61 It may well be
that there is only one reasonable way to weigh the significance of evils visà-vis theism given a particular body of evidence. The current point is just
that a shift in perspective can embed the evidence of evil within a larger
evidential context that proves more hostile to theism.62

Draper, “Comments,” 198.
Feldman, “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” 148.
P( E | H & B1)
62
Even objective Bayesians, for instance, are happy to acknowledge that
P( E |~ H & B1)
can be higher or lower than P( E | H & B 2) .
P( E |~ H & B 2)
60
61
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That being said, it is increasingly common to maintain that multiple
doxastic attitudes can fit the same total body of evidence—a position
known as epistemic permissivism.63 On permissivism, the non-evidential attitudes of the subject have some influence on what her total body
of evidence rationally supports, and plausibly, a shift in perspective can
alter those non-evidential attitudes in a way that threatens theism. Tweedt
shows how this might play out in our assessments of evil given different
forms of permissivism.64 Thus, permissivism, if true, allows changes in
perspective to result in additional support for atheism by altering how the
subject weighs her evidence.
While permissivism may be compatible with the position that epistemic support relations are objective, permissivism goes especially well
with a more subjective view. Richard Foley’s theory of inferential support provides a representative example. According to Foley, evidence E
makes it epistemically rational for subject S to form some doxastic attitude
X towards a hypothesis H if and only if X satisfies S’s deepest epistemic
standards in the pursuit of truth—that is, if and only if S would form attitude X towards H on the basis of E after engaging in fully conscientious
reflection.65 There is no guarantee, of course, that two subjects will have
the same deep epistemic standards or reach the same conclusions upon
meeting those standards. It will depend, among other things, on how
things seem to each subject. This is especially true with respect to intricate issues like God and evil. On such views, the evidence of evil might
provide rational support against theism for one subject but not another
depending on one’s perspective.
As an attempt to block support for atheism, the skeptical theist may
argue that the fit between theism and the evidence of evil is inscrutable
given the complexity of the issues and our rather poor epistemic position with respect to them. This skeptical theist maneuver may not work
if support relations are subjective in the way that Foley maintains. If after
conscientious reflection, including reflection in light of skeptical theist
considerations, the subject would still increase her confidence in atheism,
then that is what is rational for the subject to do. Skeptical theism has
no way to appeal this verdict. If support relations are objective, then the
skeptical maneuver faces other challenges. One is that the evidence of evil
might still provide objective support against God’s existence even if we
63
Permissivism thus denies Feldman’s uniqueness thesis. On permissivism, see Jackson
and Turnbull, “Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence,” and Schoenfield,
“Permission to Believe.”
64
Tweedt, “Taking a New Perspective on Suffering.” Tweedt uses the word “perspective”
in a different sense than I do. However, as far as I can tell, one’s perspective in my sense will
directly affect one’s perspective in Tweedt’s sense. This is because what the subject makes of the
evidence (a notion at the core of Tweedt’s conception of a perspective) will be heavily affected
by how things seem to that subject—e.g., how well the evidence seems to fit with God’s existence; how salient certain items of data seem to be; whether the absence of suffering seems
like a reward or one’s due; etc.
65
Foley, The Theory of Epistemic Rationality and Working without a Net.
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grant the claims of inscrutability. For if support relations are truly objective (the standard view is that they are necessary, logical relations) then
their existence doesn’t depend on our ability to discern them. Thus, the
evidence of evil could be evidence against God even if we can’t appreciate it as such. The skeptical theist may insist that evil only provides support against God if the subject can appreciate the poor objective fit between
the evidence of evil and God’s existence. Even if this point is conceded
(and it would not be by all), there is still the problem that skeptical theism
itself can be more or less plausible. As one’s confidence in ST goes down,
one’s confidence in assessing the fit between evil and theism goes up. So,
once again, there is room for some individuals to receive support for atheism, even if that level of support is diminished by the skeptical theist’s
considerations.
We thus have another way for an atheistic perspective to increase support for atheism. By either changing one’s larger body of evidence, or else
changing how one weighs that evidence, the shift towards an atheistic
perspective can lead one to reinterpret the evidence of evil in a way less
favorable to theism.
2.3.The Background Plausibility of Theism
The third way in which the shift towards an atheistic perspective can
increase rational support for atheism is by moving the subject towards a
broader atheistic worldview on which God’s existence becomes increasingly implausible to begin with. To illustrate the point, consider how
Bayesians calculate the probability of a hypothesis H after updating on
evidence E:
Pnew (H ) = P(H | E ) =

P(E | H ) Pold (H )
P(E)

The prior or initial probability of the hypothesis—its probability given the
background evidence—must be taken into account when calculating the
probability of that hypothesis in light of new evidence. Neglecting to do so
is to commit the base rate fallacy. Nothing here is specific to Bayesianism
either. The basic idea is plausible to all: If you know that q increases or
diminishes the plausibility of p, you cannot tell how plausible p ends up
being unless you know how plausible it was to begin with. This is, for
instance, why explanationists count fit with the background evidence, or
initial plausibility, as an explanatory virtue.
The shift towards an atheistic perspective can lower the initial plausibility of God’s existence by altering the subject’s background evidence.
For illustration, let us introduce a subject named “Ivan” who, after being
haunted by the suffering of innocent children, transitions to the pervasive atheistic perspective described in Section I. Ivan’s intuitions now
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systematically align with naturalism. It seems that there aren’t any gods,
that naturalism is far simpler than theism, that observed phenomena can
all be explained naturalistically, and so on. Not only would Ivan’s assessment of the intrinsic plausibility of naturalism go up (due to its seeming
simpler than once thought), but certain arguments for theism are also no
longer convincing while confirmation of naturalism is more forthcoming.
All this settles into Ivan’s background evidence such that, when Ivan gets
around to reflecting on the significance of the observed evils, the starting
plausibility of theism is much lower than it otherwise would have been.
This is a form of what Gellman calls “mediated support for atheism”
which, though caused by experiences of evil, is working in the background so to speak, apart from any theorizing about evil specifically.66
Accordingly, this is a form of rational support that skeptical theism cannot
undercut, at least not directly.
2.4. A Potential Defeater
I have explicated three ways in which the transition to an atheistic perspective can generate support for atheism. It is worth asking, as the reflective atheist will surely do, whether this shift in perspective can be trusted.
The fact that this shift in perspective stems from encounters with evil
exposes it to a number of worries. The atheist might ask himself or herself:
Is this perspective shift driven by emotional trauma rather than insight?
Am I simply angry with God for letting my loved ones suffer? If so, this
might give the atheist an undermining defeater for the rational support
arising from his or her change in perspective.
This challenge is not as decisive as the theist might hope. The first thing
to note is that, given internalism, these challenges can diminish the rational
support stemming from one’s newfound perspective only if the subject
has evidence of them. A second caveat is that the subject’s support for
atheism is diminished only to a degree proportional to one’s evidence for
the objection. It’s not an all-or-nothing matter. To fully do away with the
rational support provided by this shift in perspective, the subject would
need to have strong evidence that it could not be trusted. Such evidence is
a difficult thing to provide. For some subjects, of course, it might be obvious that their newfound atheistic perspectives cannot be trusted. Perhaps
it is plain that the perspective stems from a kind of emotional rebellion.
But this is certainly not the case for all subjects who undergo such shifts in
perspective. To the contrary, it seems to some that they have been awakened to the true state of things.67 The misleading lens of wishful thinking
has been cast aside to reveal the bleakness of reality undistorted—or so it
seems to them. If further reflection only confirms this understanding of
their atheistic perspective, then they seem justified in continuing to trust
that perspective other things being equal. In still many more cases, the
66
67

Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism.”
Gellman, “The Experience of Evil and Support for Atheism,” 109–111.
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origins of the perspective are unclear. This would give the subject reason
to be somewhat suspicious of his or her new perspective, but it would not
push him or her to dismiss it altogether.
It should also be noted that the relevant sort of perspective shift—one
on which evil comes to constitute serious evidence against God—is not
always triggered by encounters with evil. Consider a student who begins
questioning his childhood theistic beliefs after entering college and studying alternative worldviews. After reading several naturalistic philosophers, the naturalistic worldview begins to seem increasingly intuitive
until, one day, he finds himself with a strong atheistic perspective. The
student may have very little reason to suspect that this perspective shift
was the result of anything other than rational reflection.
To summarize our discussion thus far, I argued that encountering evil
can shift one towards an atheistic perspective, and that doing so can provide additional support for atheism by intensifying the common sense
problem of evil, by changing one’s interpretation of the evidence of evil
(making it fit less well with theism), and by diminishing support for
theism within one’s larger worldview. The ability of perspective shifts to
generate support for atheism in these ways is the perspectival problem
of evil.
3. The Limitations of Skeptical Theism
What if you are a theist concerned to counter the perspectival problem of
evil in others? As the previous discussion makes apparent, it is going to
be very hard to prevent the subject from having adequate reason to abandon theism if one’s atheistic perspective remains in place. Any strategy
that leaves the subject’s perspective untouched and merely tries to defeat
the justification provided by that perspective is a symptomatic treatment.
It may temporarily diminish the subject’s rational support for atheism
(some of it), but it won’t address the source of the problem, allowing the
atheistic perspective to solidify its grip on the mind. What is needed is a
response that can combat the perspective shift itself—one that can halt the
transition to an atheistic perspective or even move one towards a theistic
perspective.
The fact of the matter is that skeptical theism just isn’t very good at
this. It was never meant to be. This is not a flaw with skeptical theism
so much as an inherent limitation. By highlighting our ignorance, it tries
to prevent one’s newfound perspective from providing evidence against
God’s existence; but acknowledging our ignorance does little to alter the
perspective itself. Skeptical theism may have some neutralizing effect on
one’s perspective, for instance, by pointing to the fact that different perspectives can lead to such different and such radically misguided evaluations of evil (think of Max).68 But, of course, this same point could be made
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with respect to a great many substantive issues on which there is disagreement—disputants hold different perspectives, at least one of which
is seriously mistaken—yet that generally will not (and should not) stop
them from seeing and judging things as they do.
This is not to say that skeptical theism is false, or that it should not be
a part of the theist’s overall response. It may undermine more traditional
attempts to disprove God on the basis of evil. It may even be partially
successful in addressing the perspectival problem of evil by reducing
the level of rational support provided against God’s existence. I consider
myself a skeptical theist, for what it’s worth. What I am saying is that it
cannot constitute the entirety of the theist’s response to the problem of evil,
not if one wishes to prevent evil from rationally leading people away from
belief in God.
What would a more complete response look like? One that has the
potential to prevent or reverse the underlying perspective shift. I hope
to detail which kinds of responses are effective in this regard (and why)
in another forum, but the key is this: A more complete response should
(i) invite the subject to enter into a theistic perspective when considering
evil, allowing a theodicy or defense to be presented in the most charitable
light,69 or (ii) foster personal knowledge of God to serve as grounds for
faith in his goodness.70
4. The Problem of Evil Reconsidered
Attention to the perspectival problem of evil has other important implications for how we conceive of the problem of evil more generally, two of
which I will draw attention to here.
First, consider how we typically frame debates about evil: Do observed
patterns of pain and suffering provide evidence against the existence of a loving
God? This is the wrong question, or at least a misleading one. It conveys
that there is a non-person-relative answer—that a simple “yes” or “no” is
possible. Instead, we must ask whether the evidence of evil provides evidence against the existence of a loving God for an individual, given his or
her particular worldview and perspective. Evil might disconfirm God for
some but not others. Further dialogue must then continue from a broader
purview. We must reorient our focus on which perspectives, and corresponding worldviews, are more likely to be true than others, assessing
them for simplicity and elegance, internal coherence, fit with our other
69
This is what I believe Stump is trying to achieve through her analysis of Biblical narratives in Wandering in Darkness. See her detailed account of how narratives communicate
knowledge involving mirror neurons, second-person experiences, and non-propositional
knowledge of persons (Ch. 3–4). For a more intuitive explanation of entering into a perspective, see the notion of “looking along” the beam (as opposed to merely “looking at” it) in
Lewis, “Meditation in a Toolshed.”
70
For an account of faith and how it might affect one’s perspective towards God, see
McAllister, “The Perspective of Faith” and “The Partiality of Faith.”
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evidence, and other explanatory virtues.71 Of course, the reader will not be
surprised to discover that one’s assessment of these various worldviews
will be inextricably pervaded by one’s own perspective. There is no view
from nowhere. The point is that our efforts at discovering the significance
of the evidence of evil must proceed on a more global level.
Second, contemporary work on the problem of evil has paid relatively
little attention to the traumatic effects of evil,72 preferring to focus exclusively on whether observed patterns of evil and suffering are inconsistent with, or provide evidence against, the existence of God. The reason
that the psychological effects of evil are set aside is because they are
seen as matters of pastoral rather than philosophical concern.73 This
familiar distinction between the pastoral and the philosophical problems of evil is a helpful one. Nevertheless, the perspectival problem of
evil shows that the pastoral and the philosophical are more interrelated
than commonly recognized. For it is precisely the sort of existential crisis falling under the scope of the pastoral problem that is liable to instill
an atheistic perspective in the individual, placing him or her in a position in which the philosophical problem becomes especially trenchant.
Thus, philosophers may have difficulty gaining traction with respect to
the philosophical problem of evil until the pastoral problem has been
addressed, and not necessarily because those listening are irrational, but
because those people experience the world in such a way that prevents
them from appreciating the cogency of the considerations presented.74
If a perspective shift is needed, however, then skeptical theism alone is
poorly suited to the task.75
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